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THE EVANGELICAL-LUTHERAN CHURCH AND THE EAST GERMAN REVOLUTION 
by Robert Goeckel 
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1 990). The author's current research on the Soviet Lutherans is being 
pursued on an !REX grant in the USSR, 1 990-91 .  Research for this 
paper was supported by a grant from the German Marshall Fund of 
the United States. 
The Evangelical-Lutheran Church has long represented a key element in civil society in 
the German Democratic Republic and a key actor in political change.1 Following the 
Stalinization process, the church remained the only institution independent of the Communist 
state. Even after the curtailment of intense atheistic propaganda by the state in the 1 960s, 
this independent status thrust upon the church a role of political opposition. Thus the 
church served as a defender of German unity in the 1 960s, a function it formally sacrificed 
in 1 969, yet has retained informally until the present day. Similarly in the 1 980s, the 
church became by default the advocate for dissent on issues such as peace, human rights, and 
the environment. The church became the training ground in democracy, compensating for 
the deficit in such democratic processes in society at large. 
1For an historical analysis of the relationship since 1 945, see the author's The Lutheran Church 
and the East German State: Political Conflict and Change under Ulbricht and Honecker (Ithaca, 
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1 990). 
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The church's role as an ersatz opposition existed in tension with the church's religious 
mission, particularly in the wake of the state's liberalization of policy toward the church 
after 1 978. The church repeatedly affirmed its openness to alternative social groups yet 
sought official legitimacy as a "church within socialism." This status was conceived 
opportunistically by some, leading to coaptation; by others it was conceived broadly as a 
mandate for democratic socialism, leading to attempts to stabilize and democratize the GDR. 
The Christian Democratic Union in the GDR (CDU), on the other hand, long served as 
a transmission belt of the Communist Party (Socialist Unity Party, or SED), despite its early 
postwar role as an opposition party. 2 As a result of forced changes in party personnel in the 
1 940s and its programmatic rejection of Christian socialism in 1 952, the CDU was 
subordinated to the SED (Gleichschaltung), leaving it little autonomy in policy matters, 
certainly in public pronouncements. However, because it was allotted the task of mobilizing 
Christians and the churches in support of the regime, the CDU derived its raison d'etre from 
the continued existence of these groups and thereby remained the leading bloc party in the 
SED-dominated political system. 
Both the church and the CDU played an inordinately important role in the revolution in 
the GDR in 1 989. The transformation in turn has had profoundly different effects on these 
institutions. I shall analyze how the role of these two very different, indeed mutually 
conflicting, institutions has been altered as a result of the political change in the GDR. The 
study will find that the church's role confirms the importance of the church's inter-German 
ties and its role in East German civil society. Yet because of its greater autonomy during the 
Communist period, the church has been less dramatically altered by the revolution than the 
CDU. 
The Role of the Church: Midwife, Rather than Mother 
Despite the traditional political abstinence of Lutherans, the GDR church had become 
more critical of the state since the Hitler experience. This critical role, facilitated greatly by 
West German media coverage, proved to be a crucial permissive factor in causing the 
upheaval of 1 989. The church leadership began to call in 1 988 for change, arguing that 
"even the GDR cannot escape the need for glasnost." Activists demanded the freedom to 
travel, greater openness in the media, and greater democratization of political life. Demands 
2Siegfried Suckut, "Zum Wandel von Rolle und Funktion der Christlich-Demokratischen Union 
Deutschlands (CDUD) im Parteiensystem der SBZ/DDR ( 1945- 1 952)," in Parteiensystem zwischen 
Demokratie und Volksdemokratie, ed. Hermann Weber (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 
1 982), pp. 1 1 7- 1 78. 
29 
for economic reform were minimal; indeed the church often criticized the semi-official 
consumerism propagated by the state. In particular several meetings of the ecumenical 
movement in the GDR in 1 988-89 focussed the churches' social and political agenda for 
political liberalization. The church leadership also intensified the growing popular 
disaffection with the regime by criticizing it on concrete issues, such as its blatant 
falsification of election returns in the May 1 989 communal elections and the renewed 
emphasis on Communist upbringing by the pedagogical congress in summer 1 989.3 
The church also contributed to the unraveling of the old regime in a more specific way, 
namely by providing much of the leadership of the opposition. The number of pastors 
involved in the opposition movement has often been noted. For example, twenty-one of the 
new members of the Volkskammer (parliament) and three members of the government of 
Prime Minister Lothar de Maiziere are ordained pastors.4 This hardly reflects the fact that 
the church hierarchy was encouraging political dissidence. Rather this high profile of 
opposition pastors reflects both the limited ability of the Lutheran church to control its 
clergy, including those who collaborated with the regime, as well as the variety of motives, 
including political motives, of those who become theologians in Communist systems. In the 
context of the growing legitimacy deficit of the SED system, the greater credibility of 
pastors meant that this became a quasi recruitment path of political leadership. The intense 
political activity of some pastors has confronted the church with an organizational and 
political problem, namely how to reconcile these conflicting roles of partisan activist and 
pastor. Pastor Wilhelm Ebeling, pastor of the St. Thomas' Church in Leipzig and leading 
figure in t�e conservative German Social Union Party, for example, has been permanently 
released from church service by his Saxony-Dresden church; others, such as Rainer 
Eppelmann, leader of Democratic A wakening and pastor in the Berlin-Brandenburg church, 
have been given temporary leaves from church service. Assumption of part-time role as an 
elected representative requires approval of the particular provincial church. 
In the context of this critical role of the church leadership and the activist pastors, the 
local churches became the cradle of the revolution, as demonstrated most vividly in the case 
3 Regarding the groundbreaking Ecumenical Meeting for Justice, Peace, and Protection of 
Creation and its calls for change, see epd Dokumentation, no. 6 (30 January 1 989): pp. 1 - 1 3. On the 
state's intransigence in the education sector, see Johannes Lohmann, "Machbastion Volksbildung," 
Kirche im Sozialismus (hereafter, KiS) 15 ( 1989): 1 45- 1 51 .  KiS 1 5  ( 1989): 128. The church 
leadership's protest of the fraud in local elections in May 1989 is found in epd Dokumentation, no. 
44 (9 October 1 989): p. 4 1 .  
4 KiS 16  ( 1 990): 83; interview, Superintendent Christoph Richter, Leipzig, 2 3  March 1 990 and 
Bishop Christoph Demke, 2 1  March 1990. 
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of the Nikolai church in Leipzig. The Monday prayer services for peace became catalysts 
for public protest which encompassed hundreds of thousands with few formal ties to the 
church. As the momentum of the opposition New Forum movement grew, its leaders sought 
to shed their identity as wards of the church. The church became, as one principal church 
official in Leipzig described it, "the midwife, rather than the mother, of the revolution."5 
The church activists assured that the marches remained peaceful and orderly. The individual 
congregations provided shelter from the police in some cases. Following the collapse of SED 
authority, church officials often provided a semblance of order in turbulent and frustrating 
conditions. For example, Dean Heino Falcke of Erfurt was instrumental in heading the New 
Forum group which secured the files of the local secret police from possible destruction, 
either by the former members or by citizens angry at the continued existence of this 
organization in January 1990.6 Complete staffing of the 22,000 local election committees for 
the March 18, 1990 elections, in the face of considerable resignation on the part of the 
electorate, was largely due to the appeal of the church leadership for volunteers. 
The credibility of the church leadership among the broader population was also 
demonstrated in the prominent role played by church leaders in the processes of the 
transiti�n government from November 1989 to March 1990. In particular the , 
Berlin-Brandenburg (East) provincial church enjoyed a high profile in the transition.7 
Bishop Gottfried Forck's personal advisor, Pastor Martin-Michael Passauer, was named to 
head the committee charged with investigating the use of force by security forces on October 
6-9 in Berlin and Dresden. Forck himself was asked by the Roundtable to serve on the 
committee charged with dissolving the State Security Service and overseeing the investigation 
of any prior secret policy activity by newly-elected members of parliament. Forck's solid 
record of forthright criticism of regime policy and support for grassroots dissidents in the 
church is widely ackowledged, leading to early suggestions that he might be a Ravel-like 
choice for a newly-created office of president. The church was integrally involved in 
organizi1;1g and chairing meetings of the Roundtable from December 1989 to March 1990. 
Thus the church leaders played a key role in mediating the political forces in the shifting 
5 Interview, Superintendent Christoph Richter, Leipzig, 23 March 1990. New Forum leader 
Michael Arnold indicated the "we are acting outside the church walls," suggesting the strategy of 
arm's length from the church. Die Tageszeitung 20 September 1989. 
6 Interview, Provost Heino Falcke, Erfurt, 24 March 1990. 
7 KiS 15 (1989): 274-76. 
31 
political landscape of the GDR, providing a needed authoritative institution to facilitate a 
peaceful transition to democracy. 
Indirect testimony to the credibility of the church is provided by the SED's attempt to 
use the church to dampen political protest. This effort were certainly not new, having 
informed the policy of SED head Erich Honecker toward the church as manifested in his 
summit meetings with the church and support for the Luther celebration in 1 983. For 
example, one of Egon Krenz's first acts as successor to Honecker was to meet with Bishop 
Werner Leich, head of the umbrella organization of the East German Evangelical-Lutheran 
churches, the Kirchenbund.8 Leading Politburo member Guenter Schabowski sought to 
persuade Manfred Stolpe, leading legal official in the Berlin church, to cancel a press 
conference scheduled in a church to protest the brutal police actions of October 7, with 
partial success.9 As the situation unraveled, the regime offered compromises to the church 
on issues which had long plagued their relationship. A meeting with representatives of the 
Education Ministry to discuss discrimination against Christians in the schools was held, after 
years of refusal by the state. Pre-military training in the schools was ended and alternative 
non-military service was introduced, both key concessions for the militarized SED regime.10 
Although many would agree that the church is not the hero in the revolution and the 
evidence suggests that its primary role was as a permissive cause facilitating the coalescence 
of dissent, this in no way diminishes its importance. As a key element of civil society the 
institutional church provided leadership to the opposition and mediation among the political 
forces in the revolutionary context. 
The Role of the CDU: Bon Appetit Replaces Mahlzeit 
The key role played by the Polish Peasant Party in bringing about. the collapse of 
Communist power in Poland suggests that, in a liberalizing context, even organizations 
functioning as transmission belts of the Communist party can assume a semi-autonomous role 
and widen the political space for opposition groups and civil society. The experience of the 
bloc parties in the GDR reveals a similar phenomenon. The CDU certainly did not lead the 
assault on SED authority, but the rising level of dissent and its particular relationship to the 
8 epd Dokumentation, no. 47a (3 November 1 989): pp. 3-4. 
9 epd Dokumentation, no. 52 ( 1 8  December 1 989): 41 -45. 
10 epd Dokumentation, no. 52 ( 1 8  December 1 989): 34-40; KiS 15 (1 989): 273. 
32 
churches placed particular pressure on the CDU's compromised leadership and resulted in the 
CDU seeking greater autonomy and political clout. This change required drastic turnover 
in personnel and programmatic turnaround. 
Internal dissent in the CDU paved the way for these organizational changes. The early 
stimulus was provided by the so-called Letter from w'eimar.U This letter, sent to the party 
executive committee by four church officials prominent in the CDU on September 10, 1989, 
set in motion perestroika in the CDU. As their point of departure the initiators argued that 
the massive hemorrhage of emigration had left the church lacking in "competence and power" 
to represent those disaffected elements of society which official organizations had failed to 
represent. As a consequence they called upon the CDU to assume a larger role in dealing 
with these societal problems, particularly those causing emigration. The Letter from Weimar 
called for greater democracy within the party, arguing that "the principle of democratic 
centralism does not belong to the specific traditions of the CDU." In addition the Letter 
urged a greater role for the CDU in the bloc party system, including more openness in bloc 
deliberations, larger representation in the government, and party congresses independent of 
the SED congresses. In policy terms the dissidents criticized the restrictive media policy in 
the GDR and CDU and called for the creation of a "socialist state of law" which justifies its 
decisions to the citizenry. Finally the Letter supported greater freedom to travel and 
economic reform. The informal dissemination of the demarche engendered considerable 
debate in the CDU. Although Gerald Goetting, the old-guard chair of the CDU, called 
publicly for more dialogue in the GDR, the leadership refused to publicly acknowledge the 
dissent. But the rising tide of protest in October forced the party to print the letter in the 
October 26, 1989 edition of the its organ, Neue Zeit. In a further response to internal 
discontent, the CDU challenged the monopoly of the SED's youth organization, the FDJ, by 
forming its own independent youth organization.12 In a challenge to the SED's monopoly of 
the media, Neue Zeit and the newspapers of the other bloc parties published the manifesto 
of New Forum, arguing that this citizens movement possessed no other outlet for political 
expression. 
Such signs of increasing debate in and assertiveness by the CDU would not suffice to 
appease demands for change in the party. Although the Weimar initiative had not addressed 
the question of party leadership, demands for a purge of the compromised leadership ensued 
11 "Brief aus Weimar," Neue Zeit, 26 October 1989. 
12 KiS 15 (1989): 275. 
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inexorably in the liberalizing context of fall 1 989.13 In the Neuenhagen initiative, grassroots 
CDU groups sought to mobilize local CDU organizations in support of an extraordinary party 
congress. Many local groups of members, particularly in Thuringia in which the CDU has 
always enjoyed particular strength, threatened to leave the party. To quell the mutiny from 
below, the executive committee pressured the aging Goetting to retire and replaced him on 
November 10  with Lothar de Maiziere, descendant of a French Huguenot family. A 
mild-mannered lawyer and vice-chair of the synod of the Evangelical-Lutheran Church in 
the GDR, de Maiziere was deemed acceptable to the old-guard which dominated the 
executive committee: his father had collaborated with the CDU in its earlier efforts to 
divide the Berlin-Brandenburg church along East-West lines and the son was considered a 
weak personality.14 But de Maiziere proved less malleable than expected, moving quickly 
to purge Wolfgang Heyl, party vice-chair, after Heyl surrepticiously called a meeting of the 
presidium without de Maiziere's knowledge. At the party congress held in December, de 
Maiziere was confirmed in his new post; all but 1 7  of the 1 24 members of the executive 
committee were purged. 
Programmatically the CDU did an about face from its earlier support of "real existing 
socialism."15 The party congress strongly endorsed free market reforms and German 
unification, rejecting "socialist experiments" in its campaign slogan for the March election. 
Like most of the other parties, it called for greater environmental protection and the creation 
of a Rechtsstaat (rule by law). 
The CDU that has resulted is a hybrid of new and old. The Weimar initiative and many 
of the new officials in the CDU come from the Thuringian provincial church (e.g. Martin 
Kirchner, new administrative head of the CDU organization) which enjoyed good relations 
with · the state and the CDU during the era of Bishop Moritz Mitzenheim in the 1 950s and 
1 960s. Although the Thuringian church became more assertive after 1 970, it remained more 
pliant toward the regime and a stronghold of the CDU. For example, in the Thuringian 
church newspaper which he then edited, Gottfried Mueller, signer of the Letter from 
Weimar and now Minister of Media in the new CDU government, had criticized those 
wishing to leave the GDR in 1 984, arguing that they should give up "dreams of 
13 Interview, Dr. Wulf Trende, former head of CDU Department of Church Questions, 20 March 
1 990. 
14 On his father's role, see Goeckel, pp. 107. 
15 See Parteivorstand der CDU Deutschlands, "Wirtschaftsprogramm der CDU Deutschlands," 
CDU Texte no. 2/90, reflecting a return to a social market economic policy by the CDU. 
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self-realization in the West" and that "Christians have good prospects in the GDR and are not 
forced to leave the country."16 In September 1 989, however, he urged the bloc parties to 
"assume more profile on questions of travel, a realistic media policy, the complete 
incorporation of citizens in decision process, tendencies of rejection of foreigners, and 
concrete environmental questions." The revamped CDU clearly has sought to recruit church 
officials for the greater credibility they lend to a party with an embarrassing record of 
subjection to the SED. Yet this quote suggests the dramatic change in views that even some 
church officials have made in 1 989. The CDU campaign slogan--Turning (Umkehr) into 
the Future--also carried a religious connotation of conversion and repentence suggesting 
greater transformation of the party (and the GDR!) than has in fact occurred. 
From Church in Socialism to Church without Socialism 
The church had never been stalinized under the old regime, retaining considerable 
autonomy; hence, one would expect the effects of the revolution of 1 989 on the internal 
organization of the church to be less far-reaching than in the case of the CDU. Yet the 
political liberalization has had extensive impact particularly on the external relations of the 
church. 
To be sure, the church has not remained completely immune to leadership purges. The 
most prominent of these has been Bishop Horst Gienke of the Greifswald provincial 
church.17 In office since 1 974, Gienke long had a reputation as more receptive to regime 
overtures, endorsing GDR positions of peace, urging citizens to vote, and the like. However, 
until 1 989 his authority as bishop remained intact. Without consultingthe other provincial 
churches, in 1 989 Gienke invited Honecker for the consecration of the Greifswald cathedral 
and both reaffirmed the formula of the "church within socialism" that was used to 
characterize the relationship under Honecker. Moreover, the state expressly scratched the 
politically-troublesome Bishop Forck of Berlin-Brandenburg from its list of invitees to a 
state reception for the occasion. The ensuing criticism from other provincial churches and 
the central church office in Berlin spilled over into his own church, resulting in an 
unprecedented vote of no confidence in his leadership by the November synod. Gienke 
thereupon resigned and emigrated to West Germany. Another church official whose star has 
faded is Manfred Stolpe. Stolpe, the long-time church lawyer responsible for negotiating 
16 Glaube und Heimat, (Thuringia), 1 5  April 1 984. 
17 For documentation of the controversy, see epd Dokumentation, no. 44 (9 October 1989): pp. 
27-34; KiS 1 5  ( 1 989): 274. 
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with the Honecker government, was for the first time since its formation in 1 969 not elected 
to the church leadership by the East German church federation. Stolpe was apparently 
tarnished by Krenz's attempt to employ him to dampen criticism in October 1 989. Thus the 
political changes have had some fallout on church leaders particularly associated with the 
previous relationship with the state .. 
The Wende has brought the church relief from the SED regime's efforts to replace 
Christian belief with a socialist personality. For example, the youth consecration ceremony, 
an ersatz for confirmation, has been made voluntary. Although early indications suggested 
a continued high rate of participation by youth in spring 1 990 (90%-95%), the official 
estimates have been revised downward and some churches are now again emphasizing the 
irreconcilability of confirmation and the youth consecration ceremony.18 The state's 
proclaimed goal of "Communist upbringing," a source of major conflict with the church 
throughout the Honecker era, was abandoned already in November 1 989. The church 
leadership has become more assertive, demanding that the Young Pioneers and Free German 
Youth (FDJ) organizations be separated from the schools and that religious holidays be 
restored. The period of the alternative service option, introduced already by Krenz in 
November, has been cut from 18 months to 12 months in response to the church's request. 
Thus in policy areas that were ideologically sensitive to the Communist regime - education 
and military training - the church has scored considerable gains from the political change. 
The Communists' position on the religious question has also been altered. The successor 
Party of Democratic Socialism now emphasizes a policy of alliance and the "outstretched 
hand," in contrast to its earlier rejection of religion.19 The PDS in its election platform 
rejected the view of religion as an "opiate or foreign organism in society" and endorsed a 
"modern realistic theory of religion that recognizes its power for giving meaning to life and 
society." No longer is religious belief grounds for dismissal from the party. The PDS 
endorsed the separation of church and state and the autonomy of the churches from state 
interference, as well as equal rights for all citizens. In concrete terms the PDS endorsed 
positions that the church has long supported, such as pacificism, overcoming of consumerism 
and the destruction of the environment, religious contributions to culture (particularly citing 
Jewish contributions), and the mutual fight against drugs and alcohol. Echoing Honecker 
and Krenz earlier, the PDS affirmed that "the humanistic basis which binds members of the 
PDS and the believers is greater than that which divides them." The conciliatory stance did 
18 KiS 1 5  ( 1989): 273-277; KiS 16  (1990): 4 1 ,  43, 8 1 .  
19 Neues Deutschland 15  March 1 990. epd Dokumentation, no. 52 (I 8 December 1 989): pp. 
14- 15. 
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not help the PDS any more than it did Honecker or Krenz, but does reflect the effect of the 
revolution on the ideology of the Marxist party. 
The revolution has also altered the interface between church and state in the GDR. 
Previously, the SED's policy was set largely by the Central Committee apparatus and 
executed by the State Secretary for Church Questions, whose office was officially attached 
to the Ministry of the Interior. Any need of the church, whether pertaining to media, 
financing, construction, visas for travel, etc., required state approval, usually in Berlin. 
Since November 1989, these offices have been reduced to skeletal staffs. De Maiziere 
himself was initially named deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers in charge of 
relations with the churches by the Modrow government, thereby effectively short-circuiting 
the previous bureaucratic channel. As a result, the churches no longer require state approval 
for most activities, relieving them of state control but also forcing them to become more 
entrepreneurial in meeting such practical needs as repair of buildings. 
Not surprisingly, the devaluation of the state's role has had implications for the other 
instrumentalities which it used to propagate its policy toward the church. In the past, 
organizations such as the Christian Peace Conference had been used to mobilize pastors on 
behalf of the regime's foreign policy. Journals, such as Standpunkt for Protestants and 
Begegnung for Catholics, sought to legitimize the system. 20 The Christian Peace Conference 
has now been disbanded in the GDR and the journals have ceased publication. In turn the 
church has been able to expand the circulation of its weekly newspapers via newsstand sales; 
previously they were available only by subscription and circulation levels strictly limited by 
the state. 
If the end of Communist rule has yielded the advantages of a liberal political 
environment for the church, it has also brought some uncertainties for the institution 
internally as well.21 The church lost large numbers of employees--four times its normal 
losses - to the emigration to the West, particularly among non-clergy employees of the 
church who in many cases were seeking refuge from the regimentation in state enterprises. 
Although it is difficult to estimate, indications suggest that church attendance has declined 
since the height of the protests. Similarly the number of those studying theology, an 
attractive prospect in the past for those rejecting politicized occupations, has declined. 
Recently non-clergy church workers have even organized nascent trade unions, suggesting 
2° KiS 16 (1990): 80. 
21 Interview, Bishop Christoph Demke, 21 March 1990; interview, Manfred Punge, Studies 
Department, Federation of Evangelical Churches in the GDR, 21 March 1990. Regarding 
unionization in the church, see KiS 16 (1990): 82. 
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increased labor conflict within the church itself. All of these developments may threaten the 
organizational maintenance of the church, already an organization battered by secularization 
and state pressure. Thus the loss of its role as a de facto opposition has cost the church some 
support from society; the collapse of the state means that groups in the church no longer 
need to close ranks in the face of the powerful, centralized SED state. 
Paradoxically, the revolution has also had the effect of bringing about warmer relations 
between the Catholic and Evangelical-Lutheran churches.22 These relations had long been 
chilly, in part because the small Catholic church, existing in diaspora conditions in the 
homeland of Luther, feared being dominated by the much larger Protestant church. But the 
Catholics had also been critical of the Lutherans for their efforts toward a modus vivendi 
with the regime and a social-political role based on the concept of "church within socialism." 
Although the political abstinence had abated somewhat under the papacy of John Paul II, the 
Catholics remained more politically abstinent than the Protestants until the waning days of 
the Honecker regime. However, the Catholics have now agreed to join the Working Group 
of Christian Churches in the GDR, an ecumenical organization in which they had only 
maintained observer status. Thus the change of regime has appeared to have lowered the 
barriers to improved ecumenical relations in the GDR. 
The end of communism in Eastern Europe has meant the end of the artificial unity 
imposed on opposition groups; this holds true for the East German church as an pluralistic 
institution of civil society as well. If the previous system made strange bedfellows of 
pastors and scientists/atheists (for example, Pastor Eppelman and Dr. Robert Havemann), the 
process of electoral competition has made enemies of. former friends. Those in the church 
must, as Bishop Christoph Demke of Magdeburg put it, "learn each other anew," namely 
come to terms with the variety of political viewpoints that were masked beneath the apparent 
unity of the church. A prime example was provided by Democratic A wakening, which split 
into two factions, a conservative wing promoting human rights and reunification and led by 
Pastor Eppelmann, and an ecological-social wing led by Pastor Friedrich Schorlemmer. 
Eventually the Eppelman faction won, and Schorlemmer left the party. Another example has 
been provided by Pastor Markus Meckel founder of the leftist Social Democratic Party (SPD) 
and currently foreign minister, initially refused a coalition government with Pastor Ebeling 
of the conservative DSU. 
No longer possessing a "protected space," the church is confronted with major questions 
of self -definition and identity. First, internal differences in the church have developed over 
22 KiS 16 (1990): 81. For background on the Catholic Church in the GDR, see the author's "The 
Catholic Church in East Germany," in Catholicism under European Communism, ed. Pedro Ramet 
(Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1990), pp. 93-116. 
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the tempo and priority placed on German reunification. Bishop Leich of Thuringia, until 
February 1 990 head of the East German church federation, strongly supports rapid German 
reunification. In a move which provoked criticism in the church, he and Bishop Martin 
Kruse, head of the West German churches, signed the so-called Loccum Declaration, 
affirming that "we want the two German states to grow together. That will occur in several 
steps in the framework of an all-European process of consensus-building."23 Other church 
leaders, such as newly-elected head of the church federation, Bishop Demke, are wary of a 
rapid reunification under West German auspices, arguing that "the advocacy for the poor, 
disadvantaged, and oppressed as well as protection of the creation must take precedence over 
a nationally-oriented increase in living standards."24 The opponents of the Loccum 
Declaration charged it with seeking a "consciously political effect" and "a development in the 
church in contradiction to that which those (active in the democratization of society) want 
politically." The opponents, issuing a counter "Berlin Declaration," charge the Leich-Kruse 
initiative with making the church's role again dependent on the national entity, with 
stimulating German nationalism at the expense of dealing honestly with the negative side of 
this phenomenon in the past. 25 
Closely related to this question of the church's stance toward German reunification is the 
question of the church's relationship to the West German churches. Forced under state 
pressure to leave the EKD in 1 969, the East German churches have since retained a "special 
community" with the EKD, entailing financial assistance from the EKD and considerable 
consultation between the churches. The Loccum initiative calls for giving this special 
community "organizationally appropriate form in a church." Although it calls for a careful 
treatment of the differences between the churches in this process, it clearly advocates a 
church reunification parallel to the political reunification. Critics rejected this parallelism 
with German national reunification as a devaluation of the ecumenical movement and a 
charged that it was not based on democratic discussion within the church. Demke, for 
example, countered that the "churches do not stand under the same time pressure as the 
governments" because the special relationship continues, arguing that "the tasks of witness 
and service in the area of the GDR will for years be different than in the Federal 
23 "Gemeinsame Erklaerung von DDR-Kirchenbund und EKD," KiS 16  ( 1 990): 8-9. 
24 "Fuer unser Land," Neues Deutschland, 28 November 1 989. Quoting the position of his 
Saxony-Magdeburg synod, found in KiS 1 6  ( 1990): 83. 
25 "Berliner Erklaerung," found in epd Dokumentation, no. 1 2  ( 12  March 1 990): pp. 1 7-2 1 .  
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Republic."26 Demke rejected a simple merger of the two church bodies. Similarly the GDR 
church federation at its February 1990 synod also signaled a slower process of integration, 
insisting that the identity of the East German churches not be lost. 
The tempo and extent of inter-German church reunification is likely to depend on the 
particular church organization in question. Reflecting its special position, the 
Berlin-Brandenburg church never formally divided and is moving towards reintegration 
quickly, already holding its first unified synod since 196 1  and agreeing to "steps toward the 
restoration of organizational unity and a common legal order."27 The situation is 
complicated, however, by the existence of two regional bishops. Gottfried Forck, bishop 
of the Eastern region, served beyond his planned retirement in 1987 in response to urging 
of church leaders who feared instability in this key church in a period of increasing state 
pressure. He now anticipates retiring in September 1 991 .  Yet Bishop Martin Kruse of the 
Western region will not retire until 1 994, necessitating an interim solution for the Eastern 
region, mostly likely in the form of a deputy bishop's office until a joint bishop is elected 
in 1 994.28 The United Evangelical Lutheran Church in the GDR, the organization which 
unites the Lutheran provincial churches, will likely move quickly to merge with its West 
German counterpart. The Evangelical Church of the Union, the organization uniting the 
so-called Union churches, did not formally separate from its West German counterpart. 
Although this will make merger easier, many of the liberal opponents of a rapid absorption 
by the West German churches are found in the Evangelical Church of the Union. 
The debate over the church's response to the German question revealed another effect 
of the new situation in the GDR, namely the creation of cross-border coalitions in the 
churches. This phenomenon, turning on differences between conservative Lutherans and 
liberal Union church leaders, is hardly new. For example, in 1 971  West Berlin liberals and 
East Berlin conservatives colluded in support of the standing bishop, liberal Kurt Scharf of 
West Berlin, while East Berlin liberals supported a separate bishop in the person of Albrecht 
Schoenherr. But the increasing independence of the GDR churches after 1969 tended to 
erode such inter-German coalitions and impose greater unity on the East German churches. 
26 Bishop's report "Zu Weg und Aufgaben der Kirchen in den gesellschaftlichen 
Veraenderungen," Saxony-Magdeburg Synod, 16 March 1990, p. 5. The Federation synod resolution 
is found in epd Dokumentation, no. 1 2  ( 12  March 1 990): pp. 52-53. 
27 KiS 16  ( 1 990): 44; interview with Bishop Gottfried Forck, 22 March 1 990. Regarding other 
church organizations, see Reinhard Henkys, "Weg zu einem neuen Miteinander," KiS 1 6  (1990): 
5- 10. 
28 Interview, Bishop Gottfried Forck, 22 March 1990. 
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Under the liberalized conditions, the Berlin Declaration opposed to rapid church 
reunification was signed by liberals in the West and East; similarly conservative Lutherans 
in the GDR, such as Leich, will likely collaborate more with Lutherans in Bavaria than with 
liberals in the Union churches in the northern GDR. This north-south cleavage in the 
church interestingly parallels the similar political cleavage so vividly demonstrated in the 
March election results. 29 
The debate over church reunification naturally is intertwined with the question of which 
elements of the GDR church experience should be retained in the future. In particular the 
issues of an official church tax and religious instruction in the schools--long thought dead 
in the GDR since the SED state terminated both in the 1 950s--are now again on the agenda. 
Many in the GDR churches maintain that this separation from the state represents a salutary 
development in the modern church compared with the West German church, which remains 
accustomed to such social status. Yet others argue that the decline in membership in the 
GDR churches will leave them dangerously weak in the new economic conditions, an ironic 
parallel to the fears of many East German managers currently. And the GDR churches 
cannot expect the West German churches to continue past subsidies in the context of a 
voluntary decision by the East German churches to abjure a church tax system. It is thus not 
surprising that in March 1 990, the GDR church leadership not only raised pay scales to 
anticipate inflation, but also endorsed the church tax system.30 Yet a semi-official status, 
along the lines of a national church or Volkskirche, leaves many uneasy in the GDR church, 
which is accustomed to parishioners who are committed, even if few in number. 
Similarly the debate rages regarding the reintroduction of religious instruction in the 
schools, as in the FRG. Some favor it as a means of refamiliarizing society with the 
Christian heritage which the SED eliminated. Some see it as a way to build the strength of 
the church. Others are wary of the taint of establishment which this suggests. 
The developments since the upheavals of fall 1 989 also suggest that, in the context of a 
rush towards reunification and a new beginning, the church may assume a new role as the 
29 In the southern regions the CDU did extremely well, winning over 50% percent of the vote 
in Thuringia and approximately 45 percent in Saxony, and relatively poorer in northern areas of 
Berlin, Mecklenburg, and Brandenburg. The SPD, on the other hand, made its best showing in the 
northern areas, attaining 30-35 percent. Likewise the reconstituted Communists, the PDS, did better 
in Berlin. See Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 20 March 1 990, p. 6 for the breakdown by electoral regions. 
30 In the southern regions the CDU did extremely well, winning over 50% percent of the vote 
in Thuringia and approximately 45 percent in Saxony, and relatively poorer in northern areas of 
Berlin, Mecklenburg, and Brandenburg. The SPD, on the other hand, made its best showing in the 
northern areas, attaining 30-35 percent. Likewise the reconstituted Communists, the PDS, did better 
in Berlin. See Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 20 March 1 990, p. 6 for the breakdown by electoral regions. 
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repository of historical memory of the socialist period. The church's credibility in the 
population was sorely tested by its decision to give Honecker refuge after his release from 
the hospitai.31 Yet the church thereby affirmed its reputation for fairness. More 
significantly the church has reaffirmed this principled position by acting as a guarantor of 
neutral justice by securing the files of the secret police and, in the case of the newly-elected 
members of the parliament, analyzing their files for evidence of alleged activity on behalf 
of the secret police.32 In a revolutionary situation with more than its share of Wendehaelse, 
or political weathervanes, some press for summary justice, others advocate a new beginning 
in order to escape responsibility for their past roles. The church stands as a beacon for 
justice without political amnesia. Some, such as Falcke, fear that this critical role of the 
church which derived from its powerlessness in the SED system, will be lost in the new 
situation and call for a period of "self -evaluation" by the GDR churches. 
Conclusion 
The analysis of the political transformation of the GDR in 1 989-90 suggests several 
conclusions regarding the role of the church. First, the developments reaffirm the 
importance of the church's role as an all-German link, despite the state's policy of 
Abgrenzung. Yet the prospect of church reunification is ironic, given the gradual growing 
apart of the two churches by the early 1 980s and the relative absence of nationalism in the 
churches. On issues of church finance, relations with the Third World, and peace, for 
example, differences between the East and West German churches had been increasing. The 
East German church's relative autonomy vis-a-vis the state, however, also attests to the 
stronger position it enjoyed when compared with churches in Communist systems with few 
international ties. 
Compared with other Communist regimes, the GDR case demonstrates the greater 
importance of the church as an element in civil society. Certainly the church did not 
actively organize an opposition, as in the case of Poland. Yet the role of the 
Evangelical-Lutheran Church in the GDR dwarfs the marginal role played by the Orthodox 
churches in the political liberalization of Romania, Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union. Rather, 
as in Czechoslovakia, the church nurtured an opposition by maintaining alternative space in 
31 KiS 1 6  ( 1 990): 82. 
32 The justification and controversy over asylum for Honecker is dealt with in epd 
Dokumentation, no. 12 ( 12  March 1 990): 60-66. 
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an otherwise rigidly-organized Leninist system. The church provided a training ground for 
organizational skills and democratic practice, as manifested by the large number of 
church-based political figures in the new system. 
Despite its ideological conflict with the SED regime, the church is ironically more likely 
than other institutions to retain elements of its past experience of socialism. Little appears 
likely to remain of "real existing socialism" in much of GDR society, particularly after the 
electoral results of March 1 990. The Wende, or transformation, has left no segment of 
society unaffected, even "non-political" areas such as sports and the music scene. Yet 
because the church was less affected by the Leninist system, its rejection of the GDR legacy 
is less sweeping than in these other institutions. There have been few purges in the church 
leadership and the church's calls for social justice stand in stark relief to the popular 
embrace of West German-style capitalism. Indeed, because the regime had found some of 
the church's positions on social and foreign policy issues congenial, there have been few calls 
for an increased role for the church in order to fill the moral and ideological vacuum 
resulting from the collapse of communism, as one sees in the USSR among Russian 
nationalists. Nor is the resurgence of religion after the collapse of the Nazi regime likely to 
be repeated in the post-Communist regime. The collapse of the Leninist system in the GDR 
was due in no small part to the Evangelical-Lutheran church. It too will fall prey to the 
greater diversity of German tradition and the pluralism of liberal democracy. Yet, more 
than other institutions in the GDR, the church is likely to embody elements of the past in 
the new Germany. 
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